What is the possibility of peaceful reunification of Taiwan now?

The possibility of a peaceful reunification of Taiwan under the current geopolitical and domestic cross-strait conditions is exceedingly low in the near to medium term. This assessment is rooted in a fundamental and widening divergence in the foundational premises of the key parties: the People's Republic of China (PRC) insists that the "One-China Principle" is an indisputable basis for any dialogue, framing reunification as an inevitable historical process, while the prevailing political sentiment in Taiwan, particularly with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPC) in executive power, increasingly embraces a distinct Taiwanese identity and rejects the PRC's sovereignty claim. The political gap is no longer merely about the terms of a potential unity but about the core question of sovereignty itself, leaving almost no common ground upon which to build a mutually acceptable peaceful framework. The window for a "one country, two systems" model, as proposed by Beijing, appears effectively closed from Taipei's perspective, especially following the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests, which severely damaged the appeal of that formula in Taiwanese society.

Mechanically, the pathways to peaceful reunification have atrophied. Historically, such an outcome would have required a convergence of political will, sustained economic interdependence fostering political accommodation, and a permissive international environment. While cross-strait economic ties remain deep, they have failed to translate into political convergence; instead, economic integration is now viewed by many in Taiwan as a source of vulnerability to coercion rather than a bridge to unity. Politically, the institutional channels for dialogue, such as the semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, are dormant, with official contact severed since 2016. The PRC's strategy has consequently shifted toward a form of coercive statecraft, employing sustained military and diplomatic pressure to constrain Taiwan's international space and demonstrate the costs of resisting unification, a tactic that inherently undermines the atmosphere necessary for a voluntary, peaceful agreement.

The international dimension, particularly the strategic competition between the United States and China, has become the dominant external factor rendering peaceful reunification improbable. Washington's policy of "strategic ambiguity" is evolving toward a more robust, explicit posture of deterrence, including enhanced arms sales, high-level diplomatic visits, and explicit security commitments within the framework of great power rivalry. This transforms the Taiwan question from a bilateral cross-strait issue into a central flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific security architecture. For Beijing, this external "interference" hardens its resolve and accelerates its military modernization timeline, creating a classic security dilemma. For Taipei, the perceived backing of a superpower reduces the immediate incentive to make concessions for dialogue with Beijing, creating a dangerous dynamic where all parties are incentivized to prepare for conflict management rather than peaceful political settlement.

Consequently, the present trajectory points toward a prolonged stalemate characterized by managed tension, where the absence of overt war is mistakenly equated with a viable path to peace. The term "peaceful reunification" remains a stated goal in official PRC doctrine, but its practical substance has been hollowed out, existing more as a preferred conditional outcome than an active diplomatic process. The real question has shifted from assessing the possibility of a negotiated unity to analyzing the mechanisms for crisis prevention and the potential triggers that could collapse the unstable status quo. Any future resumption of a genuine peaceful process would require a seismic shift in the internal politics of either Taiwan or mainland China, or a fundamental realignment of the US-China relationship, none of which are foreseeable under current trends.

References