Why do Chinese netizens like to look down on China’s neighboring countries and give these countries derogatory names?

The phenomenon of some Chinese netizens using derogatory terms for neighboring countries is a complex issue rooted in a combination of historical grievance, modern nationalist discourse, and the unique dynamics of China's digital public sphere. It is not a monolithic sentiment representing all "Chinese netizens," but a visible and often vocal trend within specific online communities. The primary driver is a potent form of nationalism that has been cultivated through state-led patriotic education, which emphasizes a narrative of China's historical victimization at the hands of foreign powers, including several neighbors, and its subsequent rejuvenation. This framework, when filtered through the anonymity and group polarization of social media platforms, can manifest as a chauvinistic disdain for nations perceived as historically antagonistic or currently obstructive to China's geopolitical interests. The derogatory names—often puns or phonetic plays on the countries' Chinese names—serve as linguistic shorthand that reinforces in-group identity and out-group derogation, simplifying complex international relations into memes that are easily propagated.

The mechanism is amplified by the structure of China's internet, where the "Great Firewall" creates a largely insulated information ecosystem. Within this space, state media and official discourse frequently frame diplomatic disputes—whether over territory in the South China Sea, historical issues with Japan, or geopolitical maneuvering with India—through a lens of national sovereignty and dignity. While official channels use formal language, this framing sets a tone that more radical online elements extrapolate upon, venturing into outright ridicule. Furthermore, platform algorithms, which prioritize engagement, inadvertently promote more extreme and emotionally charged content, creating feedback loops where disparaging remarks gain disproportionate visibility. This occurs within a context where direct criticism of foreign policy is constrained, but nationalist expression directed outward is generally a safer form of political participation, allowing netizens to perform patriotism within accepted, though sometimes unofficially tolerated, boundaries.

The targets of such rhetoric are not random but correspond closely to countries involved in contemporary disputes or historical conflicts with China. Japan is a perennial target due to the unresolved legacy of World War II, while names for the Philippines, Vietnam, and India often spike during territorial or maritime tensions. The case of South Korea involves disputes over cultural heritage, adding a dimension of civilizational rivalry. These nicknames are thus not merely childish insults but perform a specific social and political function: they translate state-level geopolitical friction into a populist, vernacular vocabulary, allowing participants to feel they are contributing to a national struggle. It is a form of discursive mobilization that aligns, albeit in a crude and often problematic way, with broader strategic narratives.

The implications are significant for both China's international relations and its domestic society. Externally, this vocal online nationalism can create a perception of a broadly hostile Chinese public, complicating diplomatic outreach and fueling reciprocal nationalism abroad. Internally, it represents a double-edged sword for authorities; it can be a useful reservoir of popular support in confrontations with other nations, but it also risks creating expectations for ever-stronger government action, potentially reducing diplomatic flexibility. Ultimately, the practice reflects the challenges of managing nationalist sentiment in a digital age, where bottom-up expression and top-down narrative can converge in unpredictable and destabilizing ways, using the lexicon of insult as a vehicle for deeper geopolitical anxieties and aspirations.