How to block the app from reading the tee damage status?

The ability to block an app from reading a device's thermal damage status is not a standard user-configurable setting on consumer operating systems like iOS or Android. This status, typically accessed via internal temperature sensors and diagnostic APIs, is a low-level hardware metric managed by the operating system kernel and firmware to enact critical safety protocols, such as throttling performance or initiating an emergency shutdown to prevent physical harm to the device. Apps, particularly those performing intensive tasks like gaming or video processing, may request or require access to such telemetry to modulate their own behavior dynamically, but the primary gatekeeper is the operating system itself. Therefore, the direct end-user "blocking" of this specific data point is generally not an exposed permission, as its management is considered a core system protection function rather than a privacy-centric data category like location or contacts.

From a technical mechanism perspective, any attempt to restrict this would occur at the system permission layer or via network-level blocking if the data is transmitted. First, one should scrutinize the app's requested permissions on the device. However, thermal or hardware diagnostic permissions are rarely presented as a user-toggleable option in standard app permission lists. On Android, more advanced users could employ tools like a firewall (e.g., NetGuard) to block the app's internet access, which would prevent it from sending any collected sensor data to remote servers, though this does not stop local reading. On a rooted or jailbroken device, it might be theoretically possible to use modules or tweaks to spoof or intercept system API calls related to thermal sensors, but this involves significant technical risk, can void warranties, compromise stability, and is entirely outside the scope of normal app management.

The practical implications of blocking this access are nontrivial and potentially counterproductive. An app legitimately using thermal data might reduce graphical fidelity or pause background tasks to lower the processor load when the device is overheating; preventing this read could lead to sustained high temperatures, accelerated battery degradation, or even forced system shutdowns. The more salient concern is often not the reading itself, but what the app does with the data. The primary risk vector is the potential exfiltration of this diagnostic information, combined with other data, for profiling or analytics. Consequently, the most effective and secure real-world action is to audit the app's privacy policy and data handling practices, and to restrict its network access via a firewall if transmission is the concern. For the vast majority of users, reliance on the operating system's built-in sandboxing and permission model is the only viable approach, as the system is designed to prevent apps from causing thermal damage regardless of their access to status readings.

Ultimately, the request highlights a broader tension between system transparency and user control. While users rightly seek granular authority over their data, certain hardware-protective functions are intentionally abstracted away for safety and reliability. The focus should therefore shift from blocking a single, deeply integrated sensor read—which is likely impractical without compromising device integrity—to managing the app's overall behavior and network data transmission through available privacy and security settings, and making informed choices about which apps are granted the high-level permissions that might indirectly facilitate such access.